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Abstract 
 
As often argued, a negative perception of immigration, or even emigration, prevails public 
opinions and governments in most countries. It is argued that caused by economic hardship or 
political hardship or political unrest in countries of origin, it would threaten well-being and 
identity in countries of destination, and sometimes endanger political security. However, on the 
other hand, social scientists recognize that, being a part of the global circulation and global 
integration, human mobility bears a tremendous potential for human progress. This view is 
increasingly shared by several actors for which adequate policies could make migration a 
genuine instrument for economic and social development. Therefore, the conditions under which, 
and the mechanisms through which, migration can transform individual benefits into an 
aggregated one, for the greater society, are to be studied. From this perspective, Turkey provides 
us with an interesting case study; firstly because of its multiple migration roles as a country of 
emigration, immigration and transit, over time; secondly because, this ongoing flows of 
emigration and immigration involve various stages of a migration cycle; thirdly because, this 
migration cycle reflects, both explicitly and implicitly, some gains, and occasionally loses, both 
for the country and its people, migrants and non-migrants; and finally because of Turkey’s long-
established EU-membership process which highlights various types of migration issues. This 
report provides us with an overview of some aspects of migration-development nexus in the case 
of Turkey. 
 
Keywords: Development, emigration, immigration, remittances, migration cycle, Turkey, 
European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is common to perceive international migration as a “problem”, a “negative issue” or a 
“complexity” that necessitates a struggle to be fought against at the public opinion and the 
governmental levels of most countries (Fargues et al. 2004).  Yet, despite the concept‟s 
negative connotation, there are certain and undeniable values that the phenomenon contributes 
both to the sending and receiving countries.  Social scientists recognize that, being a part of 
the global circulation and global integration, human mobility bears a tremendous potential for 
human progress (Castles & Wise 2008, Castles & Miller 1997, Massey 1988).  More 
specifically, international migration has increasingly been treated by the academia and even 
by the international organizations as a genuine instrument for economic and social 
development.  Therefore, the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, 
international migration can transform individual benefits into an aggregated one for the 
greater society are to be studied. 
 
There has been a transformation within the studies on migration from those conventional 
studies that focus on the impact of international migration on development via country-based 
or societal level analyses to those more recent ones that pay attention to individual level of 
analyses, referring to, for instance, the notion of “human development” (Castles & Wise 2008, 
de Haas 2003). Human development refers to economic, social, political, and cultural changes 
that enlarge people‟s choices and their life chances (for a detailed study see Fukuda-Parr & 
Kumar 2004). From this perspective, Turkey, as a country of emigration as well as of 
immigration and transit migration, provides us with an interesting case study to illustrate the 
linkage between human development and migration predominantly because of its high rate of 
international migration movements over time. 
 
This essay traces the impacts of international migration on various indicators of human 
development in Turkey from the guest worker programmes of the mid-20
th
 century to the most 
recent EU-centric migratory regimes of the early 21
st
 century.  The ongoing interaction 
between international migration and human development are analyzed against the background 
of changing patterns of migration and the transformation of Turkey from a country of 
emigration to a country of transit migration as well as a country of immigration.  The 
migration-induced changes taking place in Turkey today are transforming the country's 
economy and society profoundly.  A main question to be analyzed here is how much and what 
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types of economic, social, political, and cultural opportunities are provided to the individual 
citizens in Turkey through emigration and immigration flows in the country. 
 
After summarizing the history of emigration, immigration, and transit migration flows in 
Turkey, this essay will elaborate the economic consequences of these flows for the human 
development in the country.  The second analytical part of the essay will focus on the social, 
political, and cultural consequences of international migration for the human development in 
Turkey.  In the third analytical part, there will be a discussion on how the question of 
international migration is debated in the context of Turkey‟s EU membership affairs, which 
also partly comes to the fore as an issue of human development question.  Finally, this essay 
concludes that for the last five decades international migration has been one of the most 
powerful vehicles of human development in Turkey. 
 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TURKEY: A COUNTRY OF EMIGRATION, 
IMMIGRATION AND TRANSIT 
 
Turkey currently occupies a prime place in international migratory regimes in the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin and is at the confluence of two migratory systems of great influence: the 
major reception zone of Europe and the emerging source regions of emigrants of Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East.  The geostrategic location of Turkey partly explains the country‟s status 
as a sending country vis-à-vis Europe and receiving/transit country vis-à-vis the neighboring 
regions.  The same spatial coordinates that connect the country to the transnational spaces in 
its near geographies also construe the basic tenet of Turkey‟s character in the international 
migratory regime (İçduygu & Kirişci 2009). 
 
The prominent view in attempts to explain the dynamics of international migration is, without 
a doubt, based on the fact that people migrate in pursuit of higher incomes and a better quality 
of life, from less developed countries (regions) to developed countries (regions), parallel with 
the difference of development between national economies.  Political turmoil and wars are 
further factors that accelerate such movements.  A country‟s demographic structure and 
relevant processes, to the extent that they relate particularly to the labor market, are also added 
to the equation as important variables in the context of emergence and continuation of 
international migration.  When approached from this perspective, a general assessment based 
on comparing countries in terms of their economic, social, demographic, political and cultural 
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attributes shall provide us with a starting point that gives a clue as to the potential migratory 
movements between these countries.  Such a comparison would also serve to help foresee the 
“push” factors in the source country and “pull” factors in the receiving countries, revealing 
the migration potential.  For instance, in 1969 when the Turkish labor migration to western 
Europe was in its initial period, GDP per head was USD 398 in Turkey, while it was USD 
1,933 in Italy and USD 2,520 in Germany.
1
  Today, while Turkey is still a source country of 
emigration to Germany, GDP based purchasing standard in Germany is 108, whereas this 
figure in Turkey is 28.5.  Similarly, as Turkey has transformed into a country of immigration, 
the development gap between Turkey and the countries of origin of those migrants arriving in 
Turkey is also very remarkable.  To illustrate, based on the figures provided by the UNDP's 
Human Development Report for the years 2007/2008, while GDP per capita was USD 8,407 
in Turkey, it was USD 2,100 in Moldova and USD 2,307 in Pakistan. 
 
Although sharp economic differences are often perceived to be satisfactory theoretical 
explanations for migratory movements, one should be well aware that basic determinants of 
actual migratory processes are much more complex.  Different countries having different 
economic, social and demographic indicators in the sense referred to here does not necessarily 
mean that migratory waves have emerged between these countries only because of these 
factors.  These differences might have caused migratory waves between Turkey and other 
countries only with contribution from much more complex economic, political, social and 
demographic processes. 
 
Turkey as a Country of Emigration: 1960 Onwards 
 
Turkey is among the world‟s leading migrant-sending countries, with about six per cent of its 
population abroad.  Turkey was not a sending country up until the 1960s though there had 
been the mass emigration of the non-Muslim populations due to the nation-building process 
within the country in the early years of its foundation which was in 1923
2
. 
 
The country‟s Muslims' emigration, however, awaited the 1960s and operated in the specific 
form of a contractual labor export.  After the making of the 1961 constitution, the First Five-
year Development Plan (1962-1967) in Turkey delineated the “export of surplus labor power” 
                                                 
1
 These figures cited here were compiled from various reports of the United Nations.  
2
 For the use of population movements within nation building processes, see Zolberg (1983) and Marcus (1985). 
 4   
as an ingredient of development strategy concerning the prospective flows of remittances and 
reduction in unemployment.  To promote this policy, Turkey first signed a bilateral labor 
recruitment agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961.  Similar bilateral 
agreements, specifying the general conditions of recruitment, employment and wages, were 
signed with other governments (in 1964 with Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, in 1965 
with France, and in 1967 with Sweden and Australia).  Less comprehensive agreements were 
signed with the United Kingdom in 1961, with Switzerland in 1971, with Denmark in 1973 
and with Norway in 1981 (Franz 1994).  By 1970, Turkey became one of the largest suppliers 
of workers in various labor importing countries (Paine 1974, İçduygu 1991).  These 
agreements shaped the initial stages of migratory flows to a wide extent, but starting with the 
early 1970s migratory flows from Turkey gained their own dynamics and mechanisms, which 
were quite independent from the previously structured measures of the bilateral migration 
agreements. 
 
The emigration starting in the 1960s were predominantly of economic nature influenced by 
macro-economic factors both at the global and national levels.  The movement of migrant 
workers over the period of 1961-1975, which was a period of mass emigration when more 
than 100,000 workers left Turkey annually up until the stagnation of 1974, fluctuated as a 
consequence of changes in the European migration market (see Table 1).  The number of 
workers going to Europe increased immediately after 1961, and peaked at 66,000 departures 
in 1964.  In the later periods, the recession of 1966-67 caused a rapid decline in these 
numbers.  In 1967, only 9,000 workers were sent by the Turkish Employment Service (TES), 
while over 900,000 were on the waiting list to go abroad (İçduygu 1991).  When recession 
was over, the number of emigrants increased sharply the following year.  The consequent 
economic stagnation in 1974 in almost every Western European country resulted in a dramatic 
decline of the number of labor emigrants, making a total of only 17,000 departures in that 
year.  The year 1975 marks the end of large-scale Turkish labor migration to Europe. 
According to the official records in Turkey, a total of nearly 800,000 workers went to Europe 
through the TES between 1961 and 1974 (İçduygu 1991, Akgündüz 2008).  649,000 of these 
immigrants settled in West Germany, 56,000 in France, 37,000 in Austria and 25,000 in the 
Netherlands (İçduygu 2006a: 63).  As evidenced by these figures, the biggest movement 
occurred to West Germany and France.  
 
When agreements were terminated in the 1970s, emigration slowed down and took other 
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forms such as family reunion, refugee movement, and irregular labor migration (Böcker 1995, 
İçduygu 1996a).  The Turkish government pressured by the growing unemployment statistics 
searched for new job markets, i.e., new countries of destination, for its unemployed masses in 
the late 1960s.  Indeed, the Turkish emigration to Australia and to the countries of Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) started as a result of this policy (see Table 1).  In the period of 
1968-1974, more than 5,000 Turkish workers arrived in Australia (see Table 1). Overall, there 
were nearly 12,000 Turkish workers and their dependents that arrived in the country between 
1967 and 1975.  Since 1975, the level of emigration to Australia has shifted from 200 to 500 
settlers, who migrate via family reunifications and marriages, annually (İçduygu 1991). 
 
In the 1980s, Turkey maintained a high level of male labor migration to the MENA countries, 
Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq, as Turkey's search for new labor receiving countries 
corresponded with the demand for labor force in these countries (İçduygu & Sirkeci 1998).3  
As stated by Appleyard (1995), the dramatic upsurge of oil prices after 1973, and the 
accompanying increase in the income levels of the oil-exporting MENA states with very small 
populations, boosted demand for labor.  The result was a large influx of contract workers from 
the developing countries.  Migration from Turkey to the MENA countries occurred within this 
broader context.  More than 75,000 workers had gone to the oil-exporting countries in the 
period of 1975-1980.  The total number of migrant workers who had an experience of selling 
their labor power in the MENA countries was over 700,000 from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s (see Table 1).  However, by the mid-1990s, partly due to the completion of large scale 
infrastructural projects in the oil-exporting countries, and partly due to the increasing costs of 
Turkish labor in comparison with the costs of other labor migration coming from Asia (India, 
Bangladesh, Philippines, etc.), the number of Turkish workers in the MENA countries began 
to decline.  Indeed, it fell by more than 100,000 from a figure of 250,000 in the late 1980s to 
140,000 in the early 1990s and to 120,000 in the late 1990s.  In the early 2000s, the number of 
Turkish workers in the MENA countries was less than 100,000. 
 
With the collapse of the communist regimes in the 1990s, Turkish emigration continued with 
the flows of workers to the CIS countries yet within relatively small numbers (see Table 1). 
                                                 
3
 The labor movement to the Middle East and North Africa was very much different from the migratory 
movements to Western European countries.  It was always exclusively a temporary movement of male workers. 
Their duration of stay was determined by the completion period of the work, where these workers were usually 
employed for a period of two years.  The return rate of these workers was very high, because only a small 
proportion of them could be hired by the same firm for a new project. 
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As emphasized by Gökdere (1994), after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, some of the 
newly emerging states in the region launched reconstruction programs.  The active 
involvement of various Turkish firms in these programs attracted a crucial level of project-
tied and job-specific migration.  The importance of the emigration to the CIS countries was 
overwhelmingly clear in terms of its impact on the continuity of emigration from Turkey: in a 
period, when a downturn of migratory flows to the labor-receiving MENA countries occurred 
following the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the migratory movement to the CIS countries came as a 
remedy for the emigration pressure in Turkey.  The level of Turkish labor migration to these 
states started to increase steadily: from 8,000 workers in 1992 to over 20,000 in 1993, and 
later to over 40,000 in 1994.  It declined to 26,000 in 1996.  In 2005, there were more than 
70,000 Turkish workers employed in the CIS countries.  Overall, in the period of 1990-2005 
there were over 150,000 workers who left Turkey to work in the CIS countries. 
 
Despite new and alternative destination routes, Europe remained a long-standing receiving 
area for an increasing number of newcomers from Turkey mostly due to family reunions in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Apart from the continuing family reunification flows, many of the 
immigrants arrived in the receiving countries via marriages that took place between those 
immigrants already living in Europe who would often choose a spouse from Turkey: marriage 
migration became a new form of family reunification.  After the 1980s, the number of these 
marriage migrants increased due to emerging transnational networks.  Meanwhile, the number 
of second and third generation migrants reached significant levels.  The number of people in 
Europe from Turkey increased continuously from 600,000 in 1972 to almost 2,000,000 in the 
early 1980s and to 2,900,000 in the mid-1990s.  In the mid 2000s, the total number was over 
2,500,000. 
 
Asylum-seeking was also another important dynamic of the migration flow to Europe. 
Especially in the last two decades, more than two-fifths of the people moving from Turkey to 
Europe which makes up nearly 700,000 were those who went with the claim of seeking 
asylum (see Table 2).  There were around 400,000 asylum seekers coming from Turkey to 
Western Europe in the period of 1980-1995.  In parallel to Turkey‟s poor record of human 
rights, the annual average number of Turkish citizens, who were officially registered as 
asylum seekers in the Western European countries increased from about 15,000 in the early 
1980s to nearly 45,000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 2).  Despite a 
considerable decline, the number of asylum seekers from Turkey revolved around high levels, 
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with an annual figure of 25,000 in the late 1990s.  
 
All in all, the population size of the Turkish communities in Europe grew over time.  One can 
identify three main reasons behind this phenomenon.  First, Turkish workers were staying for 
longer periods than originally planned, and were bringing in their spouses and children. 
Secondly, as experienced since the early 1980s, there was an increasing flow of asylum 
seekers from Turkey.  Thirdly, as more spouses were reunited, the birth rate of the Turkish 
population rose and large numbers of Turkish children were born in Europe.  In fact, while the 
actual number of Turkish workers in Europe showed a relatively small increase in the period 
of 1985-1995, there was a considerable increase in the number of their dependents. 
 
As an outcome of the five decade history of Turkish emigration, today there are several 
sizeable Turkish diaspora communities mostly in several European countries. Given the fact 
that in our globalized world, diaspora communities have increasingly become more and more 
connected to the origin country through the transnational networks, the crucial question is 
this: how do the diaspora communities impact on human development in the country of 
origin?  Beyond those Turkish emigrants who return home and those remittances which were 
sent by these emigrants, a variety of influences of Turkish diaspora communities on various 
aspects of economic, social, and political spheres in Turkey was obvious: these influences 
range from the emerging ethnic business ties between Turkey and the host countries through 
various industries such as food and clothing to the increasing massive tourism between 
Turkey and the receiving countries, from the emergence of new TV channels broadcasting to 
the European countries to the establishment of several disapora-based music and dance 
studios, rock and hip-hop mobiles, music schools, graffiti workshops, libraries, and alternative 
cafés and clubs in some big cities in Turkey, from the formation of diaspora-related civil 
society activities to the creation of academic institutions working on issues related to Turkish 
diasporas. 
Turkey as a Country of Immigration and Transit: 1980 Onwards 
 
Although Turkey‟s noted distinct position in the international migration regimes that include 
Turkey is a “country of emigration,” based on the number of workers in West European 
countries, intense migratory movements headed towards the country in recent years has 
transformed Turkey also to a “country of immigration and transit” (İçduygu 2003, 2006b).  In 
fact, migratory waves towards Turkey are not a new phenomenon as immigration flows into 
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the country existed since the early years of the Republic.  International migratory movements 
towards Turkey during the process of nation-state building comprised mostly migrants of 
Turkish ethnicity, living in neighboring countries.  Turkey attracted ethnic Turks of Hanefi-
Sunni sect from the Balkans and the Caucasia, which contributed to Turkey‟s religious 
homogenization.  However, especially since the 1980s, migratory practices of the early years 
of the Republic have followed a course that is substantially different from the migratory 
practices of recent times both in terms of nature and scale.  
 
Turkey has received flows of migrant groups (transit migrants, irregular workers, 
professionals, retirees, asylum seekers and refugees) from diverse ethnic and religious 
backgrounds migrating for various purposes, turning Turkey into a country of destination as 
well as transit.  These migratory movements towards Turkey are closely related to Turkey‟s 
geographical location.  Economic, political and security problems arising in neighboring 
countries are among the main reasons that drive their citizens to migrate to Turkey.  Due to 
Turkey‟s position as a bridge between Asia, Europe and Africa, and its important sea routes, 
many migrants use Turkey as a transit country for migrating to their destinations in the 
developed countries of the West.  The recent immigration into Turkey can be examined under 
two categories: (1) “regular”, i.e., those migratory movements that take place “legally”, and 
(2) “irregular” migration, referring to “illegal” or “unregistered” migratory movements.  
Irregular migration consists of transit migration of people from the Middle East, Asia and 
Africa, and irregular labor migration of people from the CIS countries.  Regular migration, 
which is registered, covers those of professionals and retirees from the West. 
 
Regarding irregular migration, one might note that the figures have substantially accelerated 
from the mid 1990‟s to the late 2000‟s.  Although some senior officials4 claim the presence of 
around „one million illegal foreign workers‟ in Turkey, there is no direct and reliable data on 
undocumented immigration. However some indicative numbers are available. The Bureau for 
Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of 
Interior reports that there were nearly 95,000 reported cases of irregular migration in 2000. 
Data on the numbers of irregular migrants who have been apprehended indicate a 
considerable decline in these numbers from 2000 to 2005. Whereas 19,000 irregular migrants 
                                                 
4
 For instance, Yasar Okuyan, the Minister of  Labour  in the 1999–2002 government often cited the figure of  
„one million illegal migrants‟ living in Turkey. Later same figure have been mentioned by so many authorities in 
the country.  
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were detained in 1996, this figure reached 47,500 in 1999, and by 2000 it became 94,600 (see 
Table 3). Starting from 2001, a decrease is observed in the number of irregular migrants 
detained: this figure, which was 83,000 in 2002, dropped below 50,000 in the year 2005.  In 
2006, there was a slight increase in the numbers of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey, 
rising to nearly 52,000 in 2006.  A total of 64,290 irregular migrants were apprehended in 
2007, indicating an upward trend in irregular flows to Turkey since 2003.  When it is 
considered that these figures represent only detained irregular migrants, it is clear that the 
scale of irregular migration through Turkey is greater than these figures.  In reference to the 
relevant literature, it should be fair to say that the true picture would be at least two or three 
times the number of migrants detained.  When the magnitude of such a figure is taken into 
consideration, it can be stated that the scale of the irregular migratory wave Turkey has 
received in recent years is comparable to many other countries of the world, which receive 
intense migration. 
 
When the countries from which irregular migrants originate are considered, it can be seen that 
almost all of the migrants that come from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh and some African 
countries choose Turkey as a bridge to reach their destination countries in the West. 
Considering the data available on migrants detained by security forces, it can be assumed that 
in the beginning of the 2000s, more than 50,000 migrants used Turkey as a transit country 
annually, while this figure has dropped below 25,000 today.  Most of these transit migrants 
enter Turkey illegally with the help of human smugglers, and leave or attempt to leave Turkey 
using similar ways (İçduygu 2008). 
 
Without a doubt, the political irregularities, problems and turmoil in the periphery makes 
Turkey‟s borders more open to asylum seekers.  A great majority of these asylum seekers 
comprise migrants of Asian and African origin.  Between the years 1997 and 2005, Turkey 
received approximately 24,000 asylum applications (see Table 4).  When we consider their 
families as well, this figure climbs up to over 44,000.  The greatest number of asylum 
applications to Turkey is received from Iran and Iraq.  46 per cent of these applications are 
those filed by Iranians, and 44 per cent by Iraqis.  In 2000, 3,926 Iranians and 1,671 Iraqis 
sought asylum in Turkey (İçduygu & Toktaş 2005).  In recent years, however, a decrease is 
observed in the number of asylum applications to Turkey.  Whereas the approximate annual 
number of asylum seekers towards the end of the 1990s was 6,000, by mid 2000s, this figure 
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dropped to below 4,000.  The migratory movements of asylum seekers, refugees, and transit 
irregular migrants sometimes intermingle.  This is particularly related to the fact that the 
majority of persons in both groups enter the country illegally.  Asylum seekers, after being 
denied asylum, continuing to stay or working illegally in Turkey or attempting to transit to a 
third country through illegal border crossings, rather than returning to their countries, are 
examples of intermingling of irregular migration and asylum seeker movements. 
 
Based on its ongoing geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva Convention Turkey still 
does not accept non-European refugees on de jure basis, but it is a de facto situation that the 
country receives numerous asylum seekers from neighboring non-European countries. The 
fact that Turkey does not accept non-Europeans as asylum seekers and refugees has several 
implications for irregular migration (İçduygu 2003; Kirişçi 2002). Most asylum seekers and 
illegal transit migrants, mainly from Iran and Iraq, make illegal border-crossings to Turkey 
with the help of smugglers and traffickers. Some irregular migrants apply for asylum although 
they have no grounds to do so. By limiting the application of the Geneva Convention 1951 to 
certain geographical areas, Turkey hopes to be immune to the flows of politically or 
economically deprived people coming from poor and unstable countries in Asia and Africa. In 
reality, however, the opposite seems to be the case: the country has been faced with increasing 
flows of people from these regions, including the Middle East. Turkish authorities have long 
feared that the abolishment of the geographical limitation would bring even greater numbers 
of asylum seekers to Turkey, or increase the numbers of foreigners settling in the country, 
which would have repercussions for Turkey‟s definition of national identity and even national 
security (Kirişçi 2005: 355-7). 
 
Apart from asylum seeking and refugee movements directed at Turkey, the country serves as 
a destination to migrants coming from countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and 
Romania that are mostly employed on a temporary basis in areas like housekeeping, 
prostitution and entertainment, textiles, construction and tourism.  These migratory 
movements take place, in a sense, in the form of circular migration or shuttle migration with 
multiple trips back and forth by the same person.  A great majority of migrants enter Turkey 
legitimately, but after the expiration of their visas, they continue to stay and become 
unregistered migrants.  Although the rate of irregular migrant workers in this category within 
the total number of irregular migrants seems to have increased in recent years, in fact, their 
numbers are decreasing.  In the early 2000s, the annual number of such migrants is estimated 
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to have reached 50,000, a figure that has presumably dropped below an annual level of 25,000 
today. 
 
It is possible to explain the change in numbers of both transit migrants and aliens laboring in 
Turkey in the context of shuttle migration with several reasons.  The relevant authorities in 
Turkey have implemented solid measures for regulating irregular migration in the context of 
procedures for harmonizing with the EU legislation, the penalties for human trafficking and 
smuggling have been increased and the issue of protecting borders is now dealt with more 
seriously. The EU process introduced a new perception and new law management of 
immigration and asylum flow in Turkey.  It seems clear that in the last five years the idea of 
European integration has already made a significant impact on Turkey‟s policies and 
practices. Accordingly, Turkey has demonstrated strong political will to tackle asylum, 
irregular migration, and human trafficking and smuggling, as well as their labor 
consequences. In fact, all these changes had direct implications for the human development 
aspects of the international migration. There were four legislative developments that 
constituted direct steps toward harmonization with international standards, and particularly 
with the EU legislation and implementations (İçduygu 2004, pp. 93-4). 
 
The first development was to fulfill the provisions of the UN Conventions against 
Transnational Organized Crime and its Additional Protocols. A draft law on additional 
articles to the Penal Code and amendments to the Law on Combating Benefits-Oriented 
Criminal Organizations was prepared by the Ministry of Justice and adopted by the 
Parliament on 3 August 2002. Through this legal arrangement, the Law No. 4771 added 
Articles 201/a and 201/b to the Turkish Penal Code to follow Article 201
5
. These changes 
conform to the Palermo Protocol against Trafficking in Persons, which introduces a 
definition of trafficking in human beings into the Turkish legal system and criminalizes the 
act of trafficking as such. The law prescribes severe penalties for traffickers: five to ten years‟ 
imprisonment. A further provision was adopted by the Parliament on the same day to 
criminalize migrant smuggling, conforming to the Palermo Protocol against Migrant 
Smuggling. These two separate but related crimes have now been fully addressed by the Penal 
Code. 
 
                                                 
5
 For a detailed elaboration of these new Articles, see İçduygu (2003, pp.77-8). 
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The second important legislative decision was related to the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and its two Additional Protocols including „The Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking, Especially Women and Children‟ and „The 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air‟. Turkey was among the 
initial signatories. This Convention and its additional protocols were approved by the Turkish 
Parliament on 31 January 2003 and put into force on 4 February 2003. Again this new legal 
arrangement was a significant step in developing tools to combat trafficking, smuggling, and 
irregular migration. 
 
The approval of the draft Law on Work Permits for Foreigners (Law No. 4817, dated 27 
February 2003) was the third remarkable change in legislation pertaining to irregular 
migration and its labor outcomes. Although the Law was published in the Official Gazette on 
6 March 2003, it became effective six months after its publication (on 6 September 2003). 
The Turkish Parliament enacted the Law in order to concentrate the administration of permits 
in one authority thus enabling foreigners to work in Turkey more easily. The Law aims to 
ensure that the work permit process in Turkey meets international standards, in particular 
those of the EU. One important aspect of this Law is to prevent the illegal employment of 
foreigners by issuing fines. In addition, it allows foreign workers to practice all professions. 
According to the previous legal arrangement, foreigners were not able to engage in domestic 
work. This resulted in the exploitation of thousands of Moldavian women working in the 
domestic sector in Turkey. The new Law on Work Permits for Foreigners and its 
accompanying Regulations
6
 (the Regulation for the Application of the Law on Work Permits 
for Foreigners, number 25214 and dated 29 August 2003, and the Regulation for the 
Employment of Foreign Nationals in Direct Foreign Investments, number 25214 and dated 29 
August 2003) are the instruments which regulate the employment of foreign nationals in 
Turkey. The procedure for acquiring a work permit has been simplified: work permits are 
given by a central authority, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (the Law, Article 3), 
and are linked to residence permits, which are administered by the Ministry of the Interior (the 
Law, Articles 5 and 12). Regulations for foreigners working without work permits are an 
important aspect of the new Law on Work Permits for Foreigners. It is required that 
„independently working foreigners are obliged to inform the Ministry of the situation within at 
most fifteen days, from the date they have started working and from the end of the work‟ 
                                                 
6 For the full text of this law and related regulations, see MLSS (2003).  
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(Article 18a), and that „employers that employ foreigners are obliged to inform the Ministry 
within at most fifteen days from the end of the said date and from the date when the service 
contract was terminated for any reason, in the case that the foreign employee does not start 
working within thirty days from the date when the work permit was given,‟ (Article 18b ). The 
Law includes penalties for foreigners who work without permits. For instance, an 
„independently working foreigner and the employer employing foreigners, who do not fulfill 
their obligation of notification according to Article 18 within due time, are fined with an 
administrative penalty of two hundred and fifty million liras, for each foreigner‟ (Article 21). 
In addition to this, „the foreigner that works independently without a work permit is fined with 
an administrative penalty of five hundred million liras‟ and „an administrative penalty of two 
billion five hundred million liras is administered to the employer or employer representative 
that employs a foreigner who does not have a work permit‟ (Article 21). It is also required that 
an „administrative penalty of one billion liras (be) administered to the foreigner who works 
independently without having a work permit given in accordance with this Law‟ (Article 21).  
 
Finally, an amendment to Article 5 of the Citizenship Law (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 
1964) which was made on 4 June 2003, had implications for fighting against irregular 
migration and protecting immigrants rights. Previously, foreigners (women) could acquire 
Turkish citizenship immediately by marrying a Turkish national. Under new legislation 
adopted by the Turkish Parliament, foreigners who are married to Turkish citizens will be able 
to become citizens of the Turkish Republic three years after their marriage. Citizenship is 
conditional on the continuity of the marriage over three years. Previously, under Turkish law, 
it was much harder for male foreigners to obtain Turkish citizenship through marriage. This 
has now been standardized. In addition, under the new law, children of mixed parents (one 
Turkish, one foreigner) are granted Turkish citizenship. The new legislation „foreseeing that 
married couples from different nationalities must live together for three years after their 
wedding to obtain Turkish citizenship‟ was enacted to discourage arranged marriages. Under 
the previous legislation, many irregular women migrants obtained their residence and work 
permits via arranged marriages. 
 
Regarding regular migration, specifically those of professionals and retirees from the West, in 
the past twenty years, an increasing number of foreign nationals arrive in Turkey for work or 
education.  Officials from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security regulate these persons‟ stay in Turkey in line with the relevant legal regulations. 
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Considering official data for the early 2000s, approximately 160,000 foreign nationals 
received residence permits in Turkey (Table 3).  For instance, in 2001, the number of foreign 
nationals in Turkey with residence permits was approximately 160,000, of which 23,000 were 
staying in Turkey on basis of work permits; around 24,000 on student visas; and the rest 
(some of whom comprise family members of these working or studying persons) on residence 
permits but do not currently work or study.  The data for 2005, however, indicates the number 
of foreign nationals with residence permits to be around 132,000; 22,000 of whom stay on 
basis of work permits, whereas 25,000 reside on student visas. The remaining 84,000 of 
residents are mainly comprised of two groups – family members, retired and unemployed 
persons.
7
 Thousands of EU citizens are arriving, settling and working in Turkey in the past ten 
years at an ever increasing rate, which is indicative that the vibrancy of Turkish economy has 
increased in a manner enabling it to attract foreign labor and migrants (Kaiser 2003, Kaiser & 
İçduygu 2005). 
 
In recent times, another type of regular migratory waves that target Turkey in increasing 
levels is the “retirement migration”.  Retirement migration generally demonstrates a circular 
characteristic, in other words migrants spend only an important portion of the year at the place 
of migration.  In the context of this migratory wave, many tourist resorts, prominently Alanya 
and other districts and towns of Antalya, Bodrum, Marmaris and Didim and surrounding 
areas, host a substantial number of retired European migrants.  Although reliable statistics are 
not forthcoming, studies so far and residence permit statistics indicate that only in Alanya 
around 6,000 European migrants reside, comprising mostly Germans.  Although we still need 
more statistical data and academic research, the number of retired Europeans in all of Turkey 
may be estimated to have neared 20,000 (Unutulmaz 2006). 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC 
REFLECTIONS 
 
In investigating the linkages between international migration and human development, three 
questions appear to be pivotal: first, what are the main consequences of emigration for 
development; second, how these manifest themselves; and third, what means they were 
brought about?  These are not easily known.  Most research on the consequences of 
                                                 
7
 The Bureau for Foreigners, Borders and Asylum of the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of 
Interior provides figures for „working‟, „student‟ and „staying for various reasons. 
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international migration for human development has been addressed primarily by looking at 
the economic aspects, as it could be anticipated from both the unquestioned importance of 
these conditions and the relative ease with which they can be measured. 
 
Emigration and Its Economic Consequences for Human Development 
 
As discussed earlier, organized mass flows of emigrants from Turkey began with bilateral 
agreements.  Accordingly, from 1961 to 1974, the recruitment of migrants was carried out by 
the Turkish Employment Service (TES), the official delegations of the receiving governments, 
and employer associations.  According to this procedure, to be able to go abroad as a worker, 
an individual had to apply to a local TES office, which would prepare a waiting list, 
containing the names of candidates for foreign employment.  The demands for migrant labor 
made by migrant-demanding countries to the TES were of two kinds: “Nominative call”, 
which was a request by an employer for a particular person by name.  In this case, there was 
no need to be on the waiting list.  Hence, the TES had no influence on the process except 
providing a tax-free worker‟s passport.  In the second kind, the “anonymous demand”, an 
employer or the government of the migrant-demanding country requested a category of 
workers to fill a particular employment vacancy.  When the vacancy arose, the TES offered it 
to the relevant candidate on the waiting list (İçduygu 1991: 47).8  
 
Neither in the early phase of Turkish emigration, which was mainly attached to the European 
labor immigration, nor in the later phases, in which labor flows were mostly to the countries 
of MENA and CIS regions, government emigration policies in Turkey did not go beyond the 
negotiations over the bilateral agreements with the governments of migrant-receiving 
countries. Apart from negotiating over some additional social security agreements with the 
migrant-receiving countries, and providing migrant workers with some special worker 
passport, the governments in Turkey did not play any role in any type of activities related to 
the pre-departure phases of emigration: no pre-departure training, no visa facilitation, and no 
other supports were provided by TES, who was the main and only government institution 
involved in the process (Akgündüz, 2008). 
 
                                                 
8
 In the peak periods of emigration in 1960s and 1970s, there had been some rumors over the problems of 
corruptions in various TES offices as some applicants claimed that some managed to go abroad without going 
into the waiting list. 
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When the Turkish government promoted labor emigration as a tool of economic development 
in the early 1960s, the basic idea was to reduce the pressure of unemployment, to gain foreign 
currency through remittances, and to provide some direct or indirect development strategies 
for underdeveloped regions of the country.  Related to the last point, the government gave 
priority and facilitated emigration of those emigrants who were from the relatively poor 
regions of the country; who were members of Village Development Cooperatives in these 
poor regions ─they were encouraged to invest their savings from abroad to these cooperatives,  
the cases to be discussed later in this section; and who were from the regions of natural 
disasters (Abadan-Unat 2006: 140). 
 
Referring to a study on the relationship between socioeconomic development and emigration 
in Turkey (Day & İçduygu 1997), it is possible to argue that there is a bell shaped relationship 
between the two: emigration increases as the regions get poorer, but when the level of 
socioeconomic development reaches a certain low level, emigration rates start decreasing as 
well.  It is within this context that while some relatively poor cities of 1960s and 1970s such 
as Denizli, Afyon, and Yozgat in the relatively developed regions of the country have been 
the main source of emigrants from Turkey to Europe, some poorest cities in the relatively less 
developed eastern regions have never become significant departure areas of emigrants (Ayhan 
et al. 2000). Consequently, different regions of Turkey have been affected by emigration 
flows at different levels.  Today, it is possible to argue that economies of many emigration 
regions in Turkey are better, stronger, or more efficient as a consequence of emigration: 
Denizli and Afyon are good examples of this process, while Yozgat seems to be benefiting 
less from emigration  - mainly due to the poor infra-structural facilities in the latter one 
(Ayhan et al. 2000). 
 
Since from the beginning, Turkish emigrants have appeared to keep in touch with family and 
friends in the homeland.  Many of them have visited Turkey occasionally on holidays, to 
attend weddings, or in response to the sickness or death of a relative.  They have sent 
remittances, bought homes and lands, and made investments.  Some of them have returned for 
good.  At the very least, one could expect this combination of massive emigration and the 
maintenance of a high level of contact with homeland to be an important factor of change in 
Turkey‟s economic and social life.  Naturally, return migration and remittances were highly 
central to this change (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 167, Keleş 1985: 63, Martin 1991: 38). Based 
on a very rough estimate, one can assume that more than 1,500,000 immigrants (Turkish 
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workers plus their family members altogether) have returned home since the beginning of 
migratory flows in 1961. 
 
There is lack of substantial and contemporary data on the Turkish citizens‟ return migration. 
Since emigration from Turkey had started mainly under the so-called guest worker or contract 
labor scheme, return migration was an inevitable consequence of the whole process.  Return 
migration increased after the oil price shock of 1973, when many West European countries 
stopped recruiting migrant workers and began to encourage return migration.  According to 
Gitmez (1983), some 190,000 returned between the years 1974 and 1977, and another 
200,000 returned between 1978 and 1983.  Another study indicates that about 1,000,000 
Turkish emigrants returned home up in the period of 1960-1990 (Martin 1991). 
 
With the 1980s, the patterns of migration and settlement of Turkish immigrants in Western 
Europe have changed from a temporary stay to an unintended settlement.  Still, return 
migration has often been a dynamic element of the whole migration picture.  It seems that in 
the early 1980s, the “Return Acts and Bonuses” of the host governments encouraged 
substantial return migration to Turkey (Ayhan et al. 2000).  For instance, under certain 
conditions Turkish immigrants in Germany were granted up to 10,000 German Marks in the 
early 1980s if they accepted to return home with their families. There were some 310,000 
returnees from Germany in the period of 1983-85, and some 10,000 returnees from the 
Netherlands in the period of 1985-86.  However, in the late 1980s, the levels of return 
migration from Germany declined sharply to 37,000 and from the Netherlands to 3,000 
persons annually.  These figures suggest that there has been a steady number of return 
migrants over the last two decades, stabilized at around 20,000 in recent years (İçduygu 
2005). 
 
However, the return migration of 1990s and 2000s is quite different from the return migration 
of 1970s and 1980s.  In fact, return today is mostly a movement of a floating population of 
emigrants between the host and home countries.  Many Turkish emigrants who had previously 
settled in various European countries are returning to Turkey, but not all of them permanently. 
Many of the first generation migrants who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s and later got 
retired have started living six months in Turkey and six months in Europe.  They prefer the 
health services and pension systems in Europe; often do not wish to give up their houses, and 
try to keep in contact with their relatives, who live both in Turkey and abroad. (İçduygu 
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2005). 
One of the most obvious implications of return migration was on the Turkish labor market. 
Some of the return migrants directly become employment-seekers as they return with skills and 
work experience for which the labor market in Turkey has limited demand.  There is a 
widespread conclusion in the literature that most returned Turkish workers buy a taxi or 
delivery truck, build rental housing, or set up a small business and become part of the service 
economy, which are investments with few employment multipliers.  It is hard to determine 
where exactly the migrants settle after they return, but it is generally agreed that they often 
prefer urban centers and metropolitan areas rather than their rural home (Eraydın 1981: 245, 
Gitmez 1984: 116, Wilpert 1984: 107).  One hypothesis is that this process contributes to rural-
urban imbalances and regional disparities as funds transferred by the migrants are often 
invested in urban areas that are already developed to a certain extent. 
Another fascinating issue is the incoming workers‟ remittances which serve the interests of 
the country‟s economy as well as the welfare of migrant households.  As noted by Martin 
(1991: 33), Turkey, as a developing country, faces perennial shortages of foreign funds to pay 
for imported goods and services, and often needs external capital to support development 
projects. From this perspective, workers‟ remittances greatly contribute to the country‟s 
economy. Although it is argued that the amount of emigrant remittances Turkey has been 
receiving is somehow insignificant in comparison with the total saving potential of these 
migrants, the scale of remittances attributable to labor migration to Europe is large enough 
and has been the most important source of foreign exchange earnings (Kumcu 1989, Köksal 
& Liebig 2005). Since the onset of mass labor migration from Turkey in the early 1960s, 
remittances have become an important element of the Turkish economy, an important source 
of foreign exchange, and a major contribution to offsetting the country‟s trade deficits (see 
Table 5).  Over USD 75 billion has been remitted in Turkey since the early 1960s, giving the 
average annual figure of USD 1.9 billion (İçduygu 2005).  Workers‟ remittances increased 
from a modest USD 93 million in 1967 to a peak USD 1.4 billion in 1974 and then declined to 
USD 893 million in 1978.  Turkey had a more or less consistent level of annual remittance 
receipts of around USD 1.5 - 2.0 billion between 1979 and 1988.  In this period, almost a 
quarter of Turkey‟s annual total import bill was financed by the remittance receipts.  In the 
1980s, remittances on average helped cover some 50 per cent of the balance of trade deficits. 
In the 1990s, the corresponding figure was over 35 per cent. 
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country had annual remittance receipts of about 
USD 3.0 billion which increased to USD 3.4 billion in 1995, and then peaked to over USD 5.0 
billion in 1998. In the 1990s, remittances were equivalent to more than one third of the trade 
deficit. The percentage declined throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Today in the 
late 2000s, it makes only around two per cent of the deficit. It seems that, as the Turkish 
economy becomes integrated into the world economy through liberalization, the relative size 
of remittances has begun to decline, but still pay for a large portion of the trade deficits: in 
1999, remittances accounted for more than 43 per cent of the trade deficit and over 2 per cent 
of the GNP.  In 2000, the contribution of remittances to the trade deficit was considerably less 
than in 1999, but its contribution to GNP was almost the same. 
 
In 2001, there was a notable decline in remittances, which continued to fall in the early 2000s, 
indicating lowest levels of remittances to the country in the last 25 years.  This was reflected 
by the proportions of the total trade deficit, exports, and GNP.  The nature of this decline is 
not so clear, which is partly due to the raising tendency towards permanent settlements in the 
host countries, partly because of the increasing informal channels of remittances, and partly 
due to the changing calculations of remittances in the accounting of the national budget, 
particularly since 2003.
9
 According to the official statistics, a very sharp decline has been 
observed in the amount of remittances to Turkey in 2004, which was a more than 80 per cent 
decrease compared to 2000, indicating the figure of USD 804 million, the lowest figure seen 
since the early period of migration from Turkey.
10
 
 
The flows of remittances are naturally sensitive to the changing characteristics of the three 
actors of migratory process, namely the sending-country, the receiving-country, and the 
migrants themselves.  For instance, according to Neyaptı, Metin-Özcan and Aydaş (2004), 
black market premium, interest rate differential, inflation rate, growth, home and host country 
income levels, and periods of military administration in Turkey have significant effects on the 
flows.  Among them, the negatively significant effects of the black market premium, inflation, 
                                                 
9
 Personal communication with Serdar Sayan (Department of Economics, TOBB University, Ankara). 
10
    The accounting system used to place remittances under a different account heading but in 2003 the Ministry 
of Finance differentiated accounts that remittances were followed and applied a mathematically different 
calculation method. It is hard to estimate how much of the 80 per cent decrease in the amount of remittances is 
due to this calculation as there combination of reasons such as the informal channels of remittances which are 
hard to track. 
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and a dummy for periods of military administration point at the importance of sound exchange 
rate policies and economic and political stability in attracting remittance flows.  In addition, 
both investment and consumption-smoothing motives are observed, although the former 
appears to be more prevalent after the 1980s. 
 
The money coming from abroad often finds its way into the maintenance of the family left 
behind or is spent as an investment in property, or possibly as part of the migrant‟s attempt to 
set himself up in a trade or other new enterprise (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 170).  According to 
Koç and Onan (2004), remittances have a positive impact on household welfare, as the 
households receiving remittance are found to be better off than non-remitting households.   
Although some argue that remittances are not mostly spent on “productive investments” that 
would contribute to long-term development, “productive use” of remittances may be served in 
a variety of other ways such as investment in human capital in the form of expenses on certain 
consumption items, education, and health (Taylor 1999, Glytsos 1996).  Findings from a 
survey conducted in Turkey in the late 1990s indicate that 12 per cent of the households that 
receive some kind of remittances in Turkey spend about 80 per cent of the remitted money on 
improving their standard of living, i.e., for daily household expenses, buying household items, 
and house renovation (Ayhan et al. 2000).  When return migrants choose to settle somewhere 
different than their point of origin in Turkey, much of the remitted money is spent on 
consumables for the new home.  Thus, although remittances do not directly help to reduce 
imbalances between regions in the country, they clearly make specific improvements possible 
in the lives of migrant households (Keleş 1985: 74). 
 
In order to channel remittance savings into employment-generating activities, Turkish 
authorities installed three unique development programs in the 1970s (Keleş 1985: 65, Martin 
1991: 35).  First, they supported the establishment of Workers’ Joint Stock Companies that 
would invest in the less developed areas rather than the developed regions of the country.
11
 
These companies were open through the remittances and the contribution of non-migrant 
households in the migrant sending regions; and if it is required, the State was able to provide 
co-financing through a public bank, Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası), maximum up to one 
                                                 
11
 The company establishment applications should be filed to Ministry of Trade and Industry or provincial trade 
offices which are scattered all over the Turkey and existing in every city. Investors should follow the following 
steps: (a) Submitting the notarized the articles of association, (b) Depositing 0.1% of the capital at Central Bank 
account (c) Filling the Company Establishment Form and Register with Ministry of Trade. 
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third of the total investment. Such investments would generate job opportunities to the 
returning migrants and serve as a tool for the economical use of their savings.  Regarded as an 
efficient way of industrializing the regions of origin, more than 600 workers‟ companies had 
been created with varying degrees of capital and number of shareholders.  The workers‟ 
companies were aiming at achieving a social goal of developing the backward regions, but 
their role in fostering development has been rather minimal.  They were unable to get away 
from the economic considerations related to the productive operation of the enterprises and 
have run into various problems such as project identification, financial and technical planning 
and management, and inadequacy of communications.
12
 
 
Secondly, Village Development Cooperatives were founded, mostly in the poor regions of the 
country, as a part of the official policy of reintegrating the migrants‟ and return migrants‟ 
savings into the local economies.  These Cooperatives were not design ed solely as a means of 
to reinvest migrants‟ remittances, but rather remittances were only one of the main sources of 
financing these Cooperatives. As many of them sought to secure jobs for their members rather 
than to realize productive investments in the villages through remittances, most of the co-
operatives were really used as a vehicle to facilitate more migration. Despite their 
shortcomings, they still had a considerable impact over the development of various migrant-
sending communities. As an indirect indicator of their impact, their number increased 
remarkably: from over 2,000 in 1971, to more than 4,500 in 1973, and nearly 6,000 in 1974.  
The number of their members was nearly one million in 1974 (Abadan-Unat 2006: 145). One 
of the main contributions of these cooperatives was the mechanization of agriculture from 
1960s to 1970s.  To illustrate, in Boğazlıyan, a town of Yozgat province that is the origin of 
many migrants to Europe, the number of agricultural machineries had increased from 300 in 
1966 to 1,500 in 1975, mainly through the investments made by emigrants (Abadan-Unat et 
al. 1976: 232). 
 
Thirdly, State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank was founded in 1975 to attract the 
savings of the migrants.  The main reason behind the establishment of this Bank was not only 
to attract the remittances, but also to channel the flows of remittances to the establishment and 
development of various industries around Turkey. The bank advocated mixed enterprises 
organized by the state and private capital, including workers‟ remittances.  However, this 
                                                 
12
 As noted by Abadan-Unat (1986), almost all of these worker companies failed, leaving only 80 (out of 600) 
with an employment of 11,000 in the early 1980s. 
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effort has been unsuccessful both in overall enterprises and in channeling the investment 
resources into less developed regions.
13
 
 
Emigration has obviously helped to reduce unemployment pressures in Turkey, but its effect 
is not easy to quantify since both emigration and employment are difficult to measure 
precisely.  Turkey‟s first Five-Year Plan in 1963 reported that “the export of excess, unskilled 
labor to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment” 
(Abadan-Unat 1986: 330). It is generally agreed that since the early 1960s, around 10 per cent 
of the workforce in Turkey has been unemployed and another 15 per cent underemployed. 
Thus, reduction in unemployment and underemployment is of paramount importance. 
Meanwhile, several studies point out the potential growth-slowing effects of Turkish 
emigration because of the emigration of skilled workers (Pennix 1982: 793).  While Turkey 
has a long history of emigration of a certain level of skilled labor, the nature of this movement 
has changed over time: as far as the early guest-worker movement was concerned, nearly one-
third of emigrants were skilled workers such as masons, carpenters, and plumbers (Akgündüz 
2008: 156). However, the proportion of skilled workers (such as workers in car industry and 
construction sector who had earned certain training or developed a certain expertise and 
developed know-how in the job s/he had been performing) declined dramatically in later 
periods. Moreover, particularly since 1980s, there is a growing trend of brain-drain from 
Turkey. Many university graduates has migrated to the traditional migrant receiving countries 
of  the United States, Canada, and Australia (Akçapar 2009). This group of immigrants refer 
to young and talented people with high social capital who continue their education abroad and 
continue working in the same host country instead of returning to Turkey. Similarly, Turkey 
has also become a source country of mass student migration: while some of these students 
tend to return home after their graduation, many prefer to stay in the countries where they 
study.  Akçapar‟s study (2009) indicates that more than half of the Turkish university students 
in the United States intend to stay abroad after their graduation. On the other hand, 
development of private universities in the country serves an interesting case of return of 
highly skilled Turkish emigrants: since mid-1980s, private universities in the country with 
their very competitive facilities have attracted many Turkish scholars, scientists, and 
university graduates living abroad, back to the country.  
 
                                                 
13
 It is important to note that stock exchange became an investment option for Turkish migrant workers in 
Europe only after its establishment in 1980s. 
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Immigration and Its Economic Consequences for Human Development 
 
As noted earlier, the new immigration flows to Turkey have been historically atypical for the 
country, consisting largely of transit migrants, irregular laborers, asylum seekers, and refugees 
who began to arrive first in small numbers, and subsequently in an ever rising tide that has 
reached sizable figures in recent decades. The nature of national immigration policies and 
practices in Turkey has been very much affected by the European Union‟s promotion of the 
notion of “migration management” in the process of European integration, transforming the 
qualities and conditions of migration and asylum policies and practices in the country. 
 
It is within this context that, as noted earlier, the new Law on the Work Permits of the 
Foreigners and its accompanying Regulations indicate an important step in legislation 
pertaining to immigration and its labor outcomes. The Law can be regarded as an indicator of 
the official “unintended acceptance” of the fact that Turkey is on the way of becoming a 
country of immigration.  It centralizes the administration of work permits in a single authority 
to ease the permit process for foreigners, matching international standards, particularly the EU 
ones. One important aspect of this Law is to prevent illegal employment of foreigners through 
issuing of fines.  In addition, unlike the previous legal arrangement that banned foreigners to 
engage in certain employment sectors, the new law allows foreign workers to practice all 
professions. One such sector was domestic work, which had resulted in, for instance, 
exploitation of thousands of Moldavian women working in the domestic sector in the country. 
 
Among different types of immigration flows to Turkey, circular type of irregular migration 
has the most direct economic implications. Circular, or shuttle, migration refers to the 
mobility of persons making multiple trips to Turkey in search of economic opportunities. In 
this type of irregular migration, entry into Turkey is typically legal, but these visitors may 
overstay their visas. An important type of shuttle migration is suitcase trade, which is also 
known as shuttle trade, trader tourism, or shopping tourism. This is a legal form of trade-
based mobility and people carry goods in the luggage that they carry during transportation. 
Suitcase trade is an effort to take advantage of the demand for and supply of various 
merchandise and differences in their costs (including taxes, tariffs and transportation) between 
origin and destination countries.  Suitcase trade to Turkey, particularly to Istanbul, from the 
Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, and later 
Bulgaria) started in the late 1980s.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
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concomitant removal of travel restrictions, entries by suitcase traders from the Eastern 
European and CIS countries skyrocketed to more than one million per year and remained so 
throughout the 1990s.
14
 
 
In recent decades, the suitcase trade has been a central component of the trade balance in 
Turkey.  Revenue from the suitcase trade, particularly from the former communist countries 
in the neighboring regions, is highly significant compared to the total remittance income.  For 
the period 1996–2003, the amount gained from the former was always higher than the amount 
gained from the latter (see Table 6).  In 2005, the amount of revenues from suitcase trade was 
nearly USD 3.5 billion, four times higher than the revenues from remittances of the same 
year. In 2006, the amount of revenues from the suitcase trade was more than USD 6.4 billion, 
indicating nearly 85 per cent increase compared to the previous year, and six times higher 
than revenues from remittances of the same year.  In 2007, suitcase trade was around USD 6.0 
billion, five times more than the remittances of the same year. Turkey‟s long established 
flexible visa regime, which is particularly open to the citizens of country‟s close geographies, 
has been very helpful for the movement of the citizens of the Eastern European and CIS 
countries.  However, as part of Turkey's recent policies of combating irregular migration, 
there have been some attempts of changing the visa regime towards a more restrictive one. 
 
Another significant type of irregular circular migration is the mobility of people who come to 
Turkey in search of informal jobs.  These irregular labor migrants are poorer people mostly 
from the CIS and some Eastern European countries who arrive in Turkey on tourist visas to 
work informally as domestic laborers, sex workers, construction workers, or sweatshop 
workers.  The majority of them appear to be women, and hail from places such as Moldavia, 
Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Transcaucasian Republics and Central Asia.
15
 
 
The economic contribution of irregular circular migration to certain sectors of the economy in 
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 Although exact figures are unavailable, suitcase trade exports from Turkey to FSU countries were estimated to 
be around 9 billion dollars in 1996 and fell sharply after the Russian financial crisis in 1998 and have not 
recovered from a low point of 2 billion dollars per year since the early 2000s, partly as a result of the 
transformation of the nature of international trade between Turkey and Russia and other FSU countries. For a 
detailed account of shuttle trade from the FSU, see Yenal (2000) and Yükseker (2003). 
15
 There are many commonalities between the mobility of suitcase traders and circular labor migrants: they are 
both largely informal, and this informality is transnational in character operating through cross-border social 
networks and linguistic and ethnic ties, often intermingled with each other. States on both sides seek to curb such 
population mobility through restrictive measures with the unwanted result of increases incorruption (Eder 2007).  
Also, both types of circular migration are characterized by the prevalence of women(Yükseker 2004, 2007). 
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Turkey is obvious: domestic care, construction, textile, entertainment, tourism, food, and 
restaurant sectors largely benefit from these migratory flows. These migrants are attracted to 
these sectors not only because they provide “cheap and skilled” labor that is needed, but also 
as it will be discussed later, they have a culture of good work, which is very much appreciated 
by the receiving communities and individual employers. Still, immigration movements to 
Turkey have been highly irregular in nature and maintaining a legal presence in Turkey for all 
migrants is very difficult due to limitations on residence and working permits or in the 
Turkish Citizenship Law.  This status of irregularity often disadvantages migrant worker in 
the labor market, pushing them often to work in the 3-D jobs (difficult, dangerous, and dirty) 
with low payments (İçduygu & Akçapar 2006, İçduygu & Biehl 2008). 
 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: SOCIAL, 
POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL REFLECTIONS 
 
The academic literature on the linkages between international migration and development is 
very much preoccupied by the economic aspects, largely overlooking the impact of 
international mobility on the social, political, and cultural spheres.  This section will focus on 
these latter aspects and relate them both to emigration and immigration in Turkey as they are 
often directly associated with human development. 
 
Emigration and Its Social, Political, and Cultural Implications for Human Development 
 
International migration has a great potential to bring about a variety of social mobility to the 
migrants as well as to their relatives, friends and their communities at large. For instance, 
there is ample evidence that emigration has greatly affected the employment status of Turkish 
migrants in the receiving countries, and in Turkey upon their return. Women are particular 
examples: migration enabled many of them to participate in labor force for the first time in 
their lives, or took them from agricultural sector to manufacturing and service sectors. Such 
changes in emigrants' employment status increased their economic well-being, which raised 
their social status, removed their burden of debt, or opened up opportunities for schooling, 
training, or entrepreneurship (Day & İçduygu 1997). 
 
The experience of emigration also affects the migrants‟ perceived social status. While in 
Europe, Turkish workers are generally accorded a very low social status, but their social 
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standing in Turkey improves markedly both in rural and urban communities. Returnees are 
usually among the wealthiest people in their villages of origin, or emigration facilitate return 
migrants to relocate in urban areas. Furthermore, as noted earlier, remittances are most often 
spent on building a modern house, buying land, and farm machinery, and purchasing urban 
apartments, cars and trucks, or electrical appliances (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976). Return 
migrants in villages with cars and appliances noted frequently that their non-migrant 
neighbors also made such purchases during the 1970s and 1980s, but they were often among 
the first with new consumer goods and usually had more of them.  This suggests that in many 
ways, emigration provided the remittances and perhaps the desire for such purchases, and 
sped up changes that would have occurred in any event. Abadan-Unat (1986: 364) emphasizes 
the conspicuous consumption of returnees, noting that some displayed electrical appliances as 
a symbol of their affluence even before their village had received electricity. On the other 
hand, it appears that social and economic inequalities have been prone to the negative impact 
of emigration: some studies indicate that socio-economic status of non-migrant households 
worsens compared to their migrant counterparts' (Day & İçduygu 1997, 1998, 1999). While 
migrant households accumulate wealth through remittances, this change in migrant-sending 
communities causes the gap between the socio-economic status of these households and that 
of non-migrant households widen. The related price inflation of properties has also an 
enormous negative impact over these non-migrant households. 
 
Turkish workers often return home with changed attitudes and behaviors: in fact, the label of 
“Almanyalı”, which literally implies “Turk from Germany” as the local non-migrant people 
call the Turkish migrants in Europe with this expression, is a product of these perceived 
changes in attitudes and behaviors (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 169). There are also changes in 
generational and gender relationships within migrants‟ more immediate personal-social 
environment; perhaps the most important being the changing status of women (Abadan-Unat 
1977: 35, Kadıoğlu 1994: 533) and the rising value of children (Kağıtçıbaşı 1988: 11). 
Emigration affected women‟s role through several ways: urbanization, the adoption of a 
nuclear family pattern, entry into the labor market, and increasing media exposure brought 
about changes in life styles and emancipation, particularly for many rural women who joined 
their husbands abroad and found jobs there. For thousands of women from Turkey, emigration 
has been a real cause behind their growing labor force participation. To illustrate, while the 
proportion of female Turkish workers in Germany's labor force was 26 per cent in 1974, this 
proportion for those females in Turkey employed outside agriculture was only 11 per cent in 
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1975 (Abadan-Unat 2006: 165).  
 
According to Akgündüz (2008: 152), there are numerous evidence that some Turkish migrant 
women made deliberate efforts to join the mainstream social life in Europe: “…young female 
workers living in München developed a custom of getting together at weekends and going 
dancing”.  Given the fact that in 1960s, dance was still something alien for many women in 
Turkey, the modernizing effect of emigration is very obvious for the individuals and their 
families. Likewise, findings from a survey of Turkish migrants in Germany in the early 1960s 
also indicate the transformation to a European life style: 20 per cent of the respondents ate pig 
meat, 38 per cent saw observing Ramadan incompatible with modern life, and only 23 per 
cent fully fasted during Ramadan (Abadan-Unat 1964). 
 
Upon their return to Turkey many migrant women have wanted to settle in urban areas, and 
they have often tended to acquire more authority within the family. For the men, traditional 
symbols of status that are based on age, kinship, devoutness, or ownership of land were 
replaced by modern indicators such as income, qualifications, skills, and perhaps knowledge 
of a Western European language. The roles and relationships of parents and children have also 
changed as a result of migration experience, which was perceived rather negatively by the 
parents, fathers in particular, as they began to lose their traditional authority over children.  In 
short, emigration was one of the factors that pressurized the extended family and traditional 
familial relationships. 
 
There are other rather unintended social consequences of emigration such as cultural-
revivalist tendencies among the Turkish migrants abroad, problems related to return migration 
and second-generation returnees (Sayarı 1986: 95). The cultural-revivalist trends are 
associated with the growth of Muslim fundamentalism as well as the troubles with Kurdish 
nationalism. Many Turkish emigrants tend to adopt a discernibly more Islamic orientation and 
many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin reinforce their ethnic allegiance.  Two factors explain 
cultural-revivalism: the defense mechanisms of emigrants in a foreign environment, and the 
multiculturalism-related policies and practices of the host countries which encourage these 
religious and ethnic revivals (Abadan-Unat 1997: 247). It is also possible to see these 
developments as a part of identity politics, a vital socio-political element of the political 
culture of contemporary liberal democratic states.  In this respect, international migration 
contributes to new identity formations at an individual level that may imply some gains to the 
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human capital of immigrants. 
 
The reintegration of return migrants and their families in Turkey also is a complexity. For 
those who returned in the 1960s and 1970s, the return and integration question was not 
critical. They were engaged in temporary labor migration, many anticipated their eventual 
return to Turkey, and acted accordingly. Also, these early returned migrants were mainly 
single men who had emigrated alone. On the other hand, return migrants in the 1980s and 
1990s were more likely to be families with adolescent children. Fearing that they might not be 
able to go back to Europe at a later time, many of them left a younger member of their family 
behind to retain their link with Europe. They could not decide whether to permanently settle 
in the host country or resettle in Turkey. Such indecisiveness together with the adjustment 
difficulties of their children who had already spent their early socialization period abroad, 
aggravated the reintegration process of these return migrants. The children of returnees had 
serious problems in adapting to the very different social and educational environment of 
Turkey. In order to overcome certain education-related problems of the children of returnees 
particularly from Germany, the Turkish government has set up some secondary schools where 
the medium of education was German. 
 
Civic values such as respect for human rights and democracy tend to increase with the 
experience of emigration (Martin 1991: 61). As Turkey grants, and even promotes, dual 
citizenship, many Turkish citizens enjoy the citizenship rights in their host countries (İçduygu 
1996b: 252) (see Table 7). Between 1991 and 2002, almost 800,000 Turkish nationals, 
indicating more than one-fifth of Turkish emigrants, have become naturalized citizens of their 
host countries. Besides citizenship, military service is another civic value in Turkey that is 
changing due to emigration: since 1908, military duty had been nearly two years, but it has 
been shortened for Turkish males residing abroad in a special program, which was a 
consequence of emigration. Accordingly, by paying a fee in foreign currency, Turkish males 
only conduct it for three weeks. 
 
Other social consequences of emigration can be observed in the areas of demography and 
urbanization. Since the early 1960s, emigration from Turkey has almost invariably exceeded 
immigration causing a slower population growth than that would happen otherwise. 
Meanwhile, emigration also caused a slowdown effect on internal migration from rural to 
urban areas, mainly from east-to-west. In the 1960s, those early internal migrants who had 
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migrated from east to west, or from rural to urban areas in the 1950s, tended to emigrate from 
Turkey to Europe: this was a type of step-by-step migration, moving internally first, and then 
internationally. In addition to these trends, there were also an increasing trend in which many 
from rural areas emigrated directly without going internally to more urban areas. In the 1970s, 
these flows together with the construction of a modern infrastructure in the country seemed to 
accelerate east-to-west and rural-to-urban migration. A survey indicates that more than one-
third of the migrants who left Turkey for Australia had first migrated from their villages to the 
big cities in Turkey, and then went abroad (İçduygu 1991). Another survey shows that while  
return migrants were not coming back to their hometowns or villages, but rather settling down 
in urban areas and in the relatively more developed western regions of the country; their 
relatives and friends were also tending to follow similar patterns of internal migration to urban 
areas and western regions.  All in all, emigration holds out the possibility of encountering a 
variety of social-transformation-producing forces (Day & İçduygu 1997). 
 
Immigration and Its Social, Political, and Cultural Implications for Human 
Development 
 
As noted earlier, a vast majority of immigrants in Turkey is irregular migrants who often 
suffer considerably because of their illegal status. Without a legal standing, the few rights that 
are guaranteed to all migrants and refugees, such as right to education, public medical 
assistance, or social assistance by the Social Assistance and Solidarity Funds are inaccessible. 
Thus, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Turkey are often confronted with various 
hardships in terms of their social, political, and cultural integration into the receiving society. 
The rather slow but ongoing changes in government policies and practices over the issue of 
migrant integration is a direct reflection of this migratory picture. 
 
Historically speaking, the immigration and asylum policies and practices in Turkey are very 
biased towards the inflows of persons of “Turkish descent and culture”. As noted earlier, since 
the early years of the Republic, Turkey has always been a country of immigration, but until 
the early 1980s this has been mainly limited to the arrivals of ethnic Turks as a part of the 
nation-building process. It was within this context that the Law of Settlement was adopted in 
1934 (Law No. 2510, dated 14 June 1934), which limits formal immigration to Turkey to 
individuals and groups of “Turkish descent and culture”. The new Settlement Law of 
November 2006 continues with this approach, which is very closely related with the 
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traditional conception of “Turkishness” reminiscent of the 1930s. The identifying features of 
“Turkishness” are not solely related to Turkish ethnicity but the ability and willingness to 
adopt the Turkish language and become a member of a Sunni-Muslim ethnic group often 
closely associated with the past Ottoman rule. Technically, Albanians, Bosniacs, Circassians, 
Pomaks, Tatars, and Turks --- mostly from the Balkans --- who are included in this definition 
will be able to immigrate to Turkey. Minorities claiming a link to Turkey who are not Sunni 
Muslims, that is, everyone from Armenians and Assyrians to Greeks and Jews, as well as non-
assimilated Kurds and Alevis, are likely to face difficulties in immigrating to Turkey. 
 
Turkey's transformation over the course of the two decades into a land of immigration is one 
of the most significant features of its recent history and very much an issue of debate. This 
relatively new migration phenomenon has had a number of social, economic, and political 
implications, not only for the country as a whole, but also in the wider context of the society 
(İçduygu 2004, 2003; Kirişci 2002). The flows of immigrants and asylum seekers with their 
diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds brought forward a number of social, political, and 
cultural implications for the human development in the country. First, although there is some 
evidence of implicit and explicit racism and xenophobia towards immigrants, refugees, and 
asylum seekers,
16
 diversity of the population is definitely enhanced by these new migratory 
inflows. Obviously, diversity enriches the environment in which people live and work, and 
consequently, contributes to greater productivity and creativity. For instance, according to 
Turkish employers who prefer migrant foreign workers mainly in the sectors of domestic 
work, textile, construction, entertainment, and food production, “migrant workers are more 
tolerant, more disciplined, more educated, speak foreign languages and are more hard-
working than their Turkish counterparts” (İçduygu & Akçapar 2006). They bring a new 
culture of work to Turkey, which is not only economically valued, but also socially and 
culturally appreciated. The case of migrant domestic workers is illustrative: they are often 
employed for child care, because foreign language speaking nannies can assist children to 
learn foreign languages, or for elderly care as they are more skilled, more tolerant, and more 
disciplined. 
 
                                                 
16
 As noted in a recent study (İcduygu and Biehl, 2008), in the public perception in Turkey almost all female 
migrants from Eastern European countries were associated with prostitution, while most black migrants were 
associated with drugs and criminality. There is countless news in the Turkish media on frequent operations 
against prostitution gangs. On a disturbing editorial piece on African migrants and criminality, see for instance, 
Aksam (Turkish daily newspaper), “Turkiye‟de siyahlar, fuhus ve uyusturucu” (Blacks in Turkey, prostitution 
and drugs), 12.06.2002. 
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Secondly, intermarriages between Turkish nationals and immigrants in Turkey and immigrant 
naturalizations are two phenomena that have an effect on the social, political, and cultural 
development of the society. Although no scholarly study exists on intermarriages, there is 
evidence that immigration to Turkey has led to emerging patterns of intermarriages mostly 
between Turkish men and immigrant women. Some of these mixed marriages are not direct 
products of immigration, but rather the cause of a marriage migration as many migrant 
women come to Turkey after they get married. In the absence of any reliable official data, it is 
impossible to give clear figures about the volume of these intermarriages. However, based on 
media coverage, only in the Mediterranean coastal tourist center, Antalya, there are a couple 
of thousand mixed marriages between Turkish citizens and immigrants. Majority of them are 
intermarriages between Turkish men and Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian women, and 
more than four thousand children belong to such mixed marriages (Today's Zaman 2007).  
Similar anecdotal evidence indicates that there are thousands of mixed marriages and children 
who are the fruits of such marriages in Istanbul, the biggest city in Turkey that serves as a hub 
for immigrants. The question of how newcomers mix with the natives and shape new 
identities along the way are very central issues of human capital in the country. 
 
An implication of mixed marriages in Turkey is legal, and related to the naturalization 
policies and practices in the country, which came in the form of an amendment to Article 5 of 
the Citizenship Law (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964) made on 4 June 2003.  The 
amendment had implications for fighting against irregular migration and protecting 
immigrants‟ rights: The main objective was to combat arranged marriages through which 
citizenship rights (residence and work permits) could easily be gained especially by irregular 
female migrants. Previously, female foreigners could acquire Turkish citizenship immediately 
by marrying a Turkish national. With the new legislation, citizenship became conditional on 
the continuity of the marriage over three years. Moreover, while it was much harder for male 
foreigners to obtain Turkish citizenship through marriage under the previous law, it has now 
been standardized for both genders. In addition, under the new law, children of mixed parents 
(one Turkish, one foreigner) are granted Turkish citizenship immediately.  
 
For immigrants, naturalization often operates as a tool to access a better life. Thus, it does not 
only reflect a type of individual gain, but also represents a broader social return, and should be 
evaluated in the wider context of human development. Turkish citizenship can be acquired by 
birth, descent, or naturalization. Turkish citizenship is open to non-Turkish people who are 
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willing to assimilate culturally and linguistically to Turkish culture based on certain 
conditions regulated by Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
17
  The law favors the jus 
sanguinus principle and offers facilitated access to citizenship to those immigrants who can 
prove that they are of “Turkish descent and culture”, which consist the vast majority of those 
people who were granted Turkish citizenship after birth. Most of these people entered the 
country based on the 1934 Law of Settlement mentioned earlier that also differentiates 
between those settled by the state (assisted/settled immigrants) and those who settle 
themselves (free immigrants). In the period between 1995 and 2006, 56,449 free immigrants 
acquired Turkish citizenship (see Table 8). While 43 per cent of these acquisitions were based 
on marriages with Turkish citizens, the remaining 57 per cent were acquisitions by 
naturalization. As to the previous nationality of the people who obtained Turkish citizenship, 
countries with the largest numbers were Bulgaria (23,634 or 42 per cent), Azerbaijan (3,876 
or 7 per cent), Romania (2,894 or 5 per cent), the Russian Federation (2,193 or 4 per cent), 
Iraq (1,635 or 3 per cent), Iran (1,337 or 3 per cent), and Moldavia (1,292 or 2 per cent).
18
  
 
Based on Turkey‟s still kept geographical limitation on 1951 Convention, the current asylum-
and refugee-related policies and practices in the country are also revealing indicators of the 
treatment of immigrants in Turkey. The specific cases  asylum seekers With no regulations 
pertaining to the status of non-European asylum seekers, Turkey has applied its domestic laws 
to foreigners entering the country, meaning that incoming foreigners are expected to possess 
valid documents and can remain only within the permitted period of stay. As noted earlier, at 
the same time, on the basis of various de facto refugee cases, the Turkish authorities for 
reasons of pragmatism have granted non-European asylum seekers some form of protection 
(Kirişçi 1995). These non-European asylum seekers are considered to be under temporary 
protection and are expected to leave the country. If their asylum applications to the Turkish 
authorities and UNHCR are processed and accepted, they can resettle in a third country; if 
their cases are rejected, they must return to their homeland. According to the new Law on the 
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 Those applying for naturalization have to be adults (eighteen years or older) and they have to prove that they: 
a) have been residing in Turkey for at least five years, b) have decided to settle in Turkey, c) have good moral 
conduct, d) have no threatening illness, f) speak sufficient Turkish, and g) have a job or income to support 
themselves and their dependents. 
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 The reason for the high percentage of Bulgarian citizens acquiring Turkish citizenship is that there are many 
Muslim immigrants from Bulgaria living in Turkey who have migrated to in several migration waves dating even 
back to the early years of the Turkish Republic. Furthermore, in 1989 there occurred mass migration from 
Bulgaria to Turkey. The major bulk of these immigrants were those fleeing ethnic persecution by Bulgarian 
authorities against the Turkish-Muslim community in the country. Although most of these immigrants returned 
back to Bulgaria, there continued family reunions as well as marriages between the Muslim-Turkish community 
in Bulgaria and immigrants from Bulgaria in Turkey. 
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Work Permits of Foreigners, only those asylum seekers and refugees who have residence 
permits of at least six months may have access to legal employment opportunities under 
certain specific conditions. Concerning the asylum- and refugee-related policies and practices, 
there are two main issues which are hotly debated both in Turkey and in the context of 
Turkey‟s international relations: first, the question of if Turkey will lift the geographical 
limitation on 1951 Convention; and second, the issue of the treatment of asylum seekers and 
refugees, and even of the irregular migrants as they are often intermingled with the asylum 
seekers and refugees. Although the Turkish government has often faced with the criticisms 
coming from both domestic and international actors, it appears that it is quite reluctant to lift 
this limitation before the full membership of EU with the argument that Turkey will be a 
buffer zone between the EU countries and the origin countries of asylum seekers, and will 
carry the burden of these movements rather than sharing them with the EU countries (Kirişci, 
2002; 2005). On the other hand, in order to positively respond to the criticisms over the issues 
of the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, and even of the irregular migrants, there have 
been constructive steps taken by the national authorities in the country. In particular, in 
relation to the controversial use of detention in guest houses, which is often subject to debates 
over mistreatments there, there are some new projects conducted through the collaborations 
with the EU authorities, in which the construction of several guest houses is already started as 
well as various new administrative and legal arrangements have been planned for the coming 
years.
19
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: A DEBATE ON 
TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP 
 
“Gradual realization of the free flow of workers” from Turkey into the European Economic 
Community was considered as a significant and positive issue in the Ankara Agreement of 
1963, signed two years after the initiation of the intense migratory movement from Turkey to 
Europe in 1961 (Çiçekli 1998: 66). However, 42 years after this Agreement, the Negotiating 
Framework of 3 October 2005 between Turkey and the EU, stated that long transition periods, 
derogations, specific arrangements, or provisions of permanent protection might apply for the 
free movement of people when necessary, emphasizing the importance of the issue once 
again, this time in a negative context. Various reports by the European Commission on Turkey 
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 See Turkish Ministry of Interior and UNHCR Turkey Office, Asylum and Migration Legislation, Baskent Matbaasi, 
Ankara, 2005 
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have underlined that Turkey‟s accession will be different from the previous enlargements, 
frequently making references to the issues of international migration. 
Turkey‟s significant position as a country of emigration, immigration, and transit, particularly 
within the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes, and the intermingling of 
international migration issues with the EU‟s economic, social and political policies of 
integration make international migration a central issue in Turkey-EU relations (İçduygu 
2006). The EU puts forward three concerns in relation to Turkey's accession with international 
migration: (a) with reference to the adjustment problems of the immigrants of Turkish origin 
in Europe, an intense migratory wave towards the EU in case of free movement will create 
serious economic, social, and political integration problems; (b) whether Turkey‟s 
demography, and the migration waves of Turkish origin as a consequence of this demography, 
will have a complementary role on the demographic shrinkage process (low fertility and 
intense aging population) in the EU; and (c) whether Turkey, as a “receiving country” and 
“migration transit zone” will be successful in producing and implementing policies in 
compliance with the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes, and if so to what 
extent. 
The main question really is whether any possible immigration from Turkey to Europe will 
have any negative impacts on the human capital in the continent and the axis of this concern is 
centered around socio-economic and demographic differences between Turkey and the EU.  
For instance, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Turkey is apparently the 
poorest country in comparison to the EU member states: in 2005, the average value in terms 
of GDP-based Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) for the EU-25 was 100.  While this value 
was 105.5 for Italy, 48.7 for Poland, and 30.5 for Bulgaria, it was only 28.5 for Turkey 
(İçduygu 2006). In terms of demographic differences, the fact that Turkey has a higher density 
of its population employed in agriculture, a predominantly younger population, higher rates of 
population growth, higher fertility rates, higher infant and child mortality rates, more under-
population in urban areas, sharper differences between regions and between urban and rural 
areas than the EU member states also reinforces the concerns of negative implications of a 
possible Turkish membership on the human capital of the EU. There are two contradictory 
perspectives on the issue: 
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• Discrepancy based on demographic differences: Based on the profound differences in terms 
of specific demographic indicators, this perspective argues that there are serious differences in 
social, cultural, economic and political domains between Turkey and the EU member 
countries; and emphasizing this point, frequently fosters a negative stand in terms of Turkey‟s 
EU membership, alleging difficulties regarding Turkey‟s adjustment to the EU (Coleman 
2004). 
 
• Complementariness based on demographic differences: Based on the assumption that the EU 
will seriously require a young population for social and economic reasons due to  its aging 
population and declining fertility rates , this perspective argues that Turkey as a member of 
the EU will provide significant contribution to the European Union. Arguing that Turkey‟s 
demographic structure is complementary to the demography of the EU, this view provides a 
positive perception of Turkey‟s EU membership (see Behar 2006, Muenz 2006). 
 
However, the extent to which this demographic complementariness will be realized or not is 
also an issue of debate (Behar 2006, Fargues 2005). To illustrate, if no migration occurs 
between 2005 and 2025, the population of age under 40 will get smaller, while the age group 
between 40 and 65 will remain constant and the ratio of the 65+ age group to the entire 
population will increase in the EU-27 member states (İçduygu 2006). If Turkey‟s accession to 
the EU occurs today, the changes that will take place in the EU from this date to the year 2025 
in percentages will be as follows: The size of the active young section (ages 20 to 40) will 
decline by 12 per cent; active middle aged section (ages 40 to 60) will increase by 6 per cent, 
and the elderly section (ages 65+) will increase by 37 per cent. In the light of the above 
comparison, Turkey‟s accession to the European Union with its young population, which is 
much more rapidly growing than the EU, might slowdown the decline of active young 
population within the entire EU population. However, it will obviously not totally resolve the 
issue of aging population in the EU. The number of immigrants that the labor force market in 
the EU might require cannot be met even if Turkey‟s entire population migrates there. 
Moreover, the size of the workforce in Turkey, which is 35 million today, will reach 47 
million in the year 2025, and 51 million in 2050. In short, it is evident that the transformation 
of the population in Turkey in the following 20 to 45 years cannot meet the expectations of 
the population in Europe. 
 
Furthermore, obviously, not everybody will migrate. In order to find an answer for the 
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question “Who will migrate?” the desire to migrate to the EU member states can be examined 
under two levels (Krieger & Maitre 2006): the level of general intention where the question 
whether a general desire to migrate to the EU member states exists has been examined; and 
the level specific intention, which is an effort to achieve more definite and detailed 
information on the desire to migrate. In the light of these two indicators, Turkey can be said to 
demonstrate an interesting case. While Turkey has the largest number of people with a general 
intention to migrate among thirteen countries (after the recent significant expansion, 10 
member states of the EU, new members of Bulgaria and Romania, and candidate Turkey), 
Turkey also has the least number of people with a specific intention to migrate. At the same 
time, it seems that only 0.3 per cent of the Turkish population has a specific intention to 
migrate in the following five years. If asked, “how does this relatively contradictory situation 
translate into possible migration from Turkey following the realization of free movement?”, it 
is possible to say the following: Considering that in 2003, the potential for possible Turkish 
emigrants was 48.9 million, it can be estimated that the potential size of population with a 
general intention to migrate will be 3.03 million, and of those with a specific intention to 
migrate will be 150,000 (İçduygu 2006). 
 
The search for answers to the question regarding the common characteristics of people with a 
general intention to migrate has also revealed interesting results. The possible migratory 
movement from Turkey is expected to include people from rural areas, with a lower level of 
income, and moreover, mobility among the unemployed is expected to be relatively high. 
Based on these three attributes, it can be argued that the possible migration from Turkey will 
result in serious adjustment problems in the labor force markets of the migrant receiving 
countries. However, another important aspect regarding the prospective emigrants within 
possible migratory movements from Turkey is that they are mainly university graduates or 
current students. Considering this aspect, possible migratory movements from Turkey may not 
cause serious integration problems in economic terms (İçduygu 2006). 
 
The main conclusion here is that both the view of discrepancy based on demographic 
difference, and the view of complementariness based on demographic difference are 
inadequate in explaining how the potential international migratory movements will shape the 
EU-Turkey relations in the future. These differences may imply a potential for migratory 
movements, however, a series of quite different processes are required for this potential to be 
realized. What is important here is to explain how this process of transformation might occur 
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in the future. Also, it will not be very realistic to emphasize the positive impacts of the 
migratory movement from Turkey on the EU population solely based on the demographic 
complementariness thesis, and to expect that these positive impacts will immediately occur as 
soon as Turkey becomes a member state. Population and migration are dynamic elements, and 
these dynamic elements become even more complex through economic, social, and political 
processes. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Based on extensive literature review, this essay has addressed some of the economic and 
social consequences of emigration from and immigration to Turkey, and has related them to 
the human development in the country. Despite the plethora of studies on Turkey and 
international migration, few take a specific focus on the effects of these migratory movements 
on the country in general and on human development in specific. With the number of Turkish 
emigrants living abroad reaching more than four million people and with a level of annual 
immigration into the country amounting to a couple of hundred thousands, there is a need to 
extract and synthesize a coherent body of knowledge on the consequences of emigration and 
immigration for the people in Turkey. 
The Turkish case provides a unique research setting mainly due to three basic reasons: first, 
Turkey keeps its significant position in the ongoing regimes of international migration within 
its neighboring regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa as a country of both some “old” and some 
“new” emigrations. Secondly, the country has also increasingly become a country of 
immigration and transit in the last three decades. Thirdly, although migration-related issues lost 
their official importance in the 1980s and 1990s, in recent years the Turkish governments again 
became very conscious about migration, mostly because of EU affairs. 
Within this framework, the literature on Turkey and international migration provides 
conclusions on the economic and social consequences of emigration and immigration at a very 
high level of generality.  This literature can be divided into three periods: (a) the 1960s and 
1970s that witnessed a lively discussion on the likelihood of contribution of the emigration 
flows to the economy of the country both at macro and micro levels; (b) the periods of 1980s 
and 1990s that covered a sluggish debate, mostly on the negative social and cultural 
consequences of emigration, such as adaptation problems of children of return migrants or 
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revival of ethnic Kurdish nationalism and religious fundamentalism among Turkish emigrants 
in Europe; (c) the period of late 1990s and early 2000s when a dynamic debate started to 
emerge on the consequences of emigration and immigration, which is still far from being a 
thorough evaluation of the issue.  In the meantime, emergence of immigration and transit flows 
into the country in the last three decades has made the migratory arena extremely complex in 
which any examination of the impact of international migration on development of the country 
and on its people becomes a difficult task. 
On the whole, migration has been one of most powerful vehicles of social change in Turkey, 
but a lack of foresight and adequate planning has caused a partial waste of human and 
financial resources (Abadan-Unat 1986: 365). Still, migration has had highly positive 
contributions to Turkey's economic and social settings. To illustrate, it was a result of 
emigration that Turkey's unemployment problem was partly solved with three million 
expatriate Turkish citizens working in Europe; their remittances had financed two thirds of the 
country‟s trade deficit in the 1990s; and they took on the bridging role between Turkey and 
the EU (see Kaya & Kentel 2005). Likewise, it was a direct consequence of immigration that 
the human geography of internationally famed cities of Turkey, such as Antalya and Istanbul 
has enriched so much (İçduygu & Biehl 2008); or the labor demands of the domestic sector 
was largely met; or the revenues of “suitcase trade” ameliorated the economy at hard times.  
All in all, international migration has changed a lot in Turkish society, culture, and economy. 
 
From the perspective of the experience of Turkish emigration since the early 1960s and that of 
the immigration since the early 1980s, possibly there are three main conclusions that one can 
draw in order to improve the positive human development outcomes of international 
migration and to reduce its negative effects: Firstly, there is a need for a good governance of 
international migration in which the crucial mechanism is the collaboration of the sending and 
receiving countries, and the migrants themselves throughout the whole process of migration, 
including pre-departure, migration itself, and post-arrival, and migrants‟ settlement and 
integration phases. Secondly, again there is a need for a good governance of international 
migration in which the two main state actors, the sending and receiving states, must share the 
burdens of the whole process rather than shifting them to the shoulders of other actor. Thirdly, 
in the age of globalization, the notion of transnationalism rather than that of nationalism must 
be incorporated into the idea of good governance of international migration by the related 
actors of the migratory process, the sending and receiving countries, and the migrants 
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themselves. Inevitably, international community with its international organizations and 
agencies must be playing its governance role in the good governance of international 
migration. 
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 Table 1: Turkish Labor Migration by Destination, 1961-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006a) based on various official sources in Turkey. 
 
 
 
Host Countries 
1961-1974 1975-1980 1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 Total 
 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Europe 790017 97.5 13426 12.8 2612 0.6 9647 2.8 10465 9.3 16561 9.1 842728 42.4 
Arab Countries 2441 0.3 74181 70.6 423208 97.7 208274 60.4 32195 28.5 57974 31.9 798273 40.2 
Australia 5806 0.7 2647 2.5 2478 0.6 1324 0.4 515 0.5 176 0.1 12946 0.7 
CIS Countries  -  -  - 115 0.0 65521 58.0 89623 49.3 155259 7.8 
Others 12235 1.5 14792 14.1 4875 1.1 125238 36.3 4256 3.8 17533 9.6 178929 9.0 
Total 810499 100 105046 100 433173 100 344598 100 112952 100 181867 100 1988135 100 
  
Table 2: Turkish Asylum-Seekers by Destination, 1981-2005 
 
Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006a) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat.. 
  
 
 
 
 
Destination 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1981-2005 
 # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Europe 45620  185797  175557 98.6 141226 97.9 107534 97.2 655734 98.7 
Canada     755 0.4 1919 1.3 2451 2.2 5125 0.8 
Australia     780 0.4 928 0.6 332 0.3 2040 0.3 
USA     984 0.6 199 0.1 330 0.3 1513 0.2 
Total     178076 100.0 144272 100.0 110647 100.0 664412 100.0 
  
Table 3: Figures Related to International Migratory Movements around Turkey (1996-
2005) (persons) 
 
Unregistered 
Migration 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
18800 28400 29400 47500 94600 92400 82800 56200 61200 43841 
*Illegal 
Entries 
    51400 57300 44200 30348 34745 19920 
*Visa 
Expirations 
    43200 35100 38600 25852 26455 23921 
Asylum 
Applications 
 5100 6800 6600 5700 5200 3794 3966 3908 3914 
*Persons of 
Afghan 
origin 
    100 400 47 77 341 365 
*Persons of 
Iranian origin 
 1700 2000 3800 3900 3500 2505 3108 2029 1716 
*Persons of 
Iraqi origin 
 3300 4700 2500 1600 1000 974 342 964 1047 
Residence 
Permits 
    168100 161254 157670 152203 155500 131594 
*Work     24200 22414 22556 21650 27500 22130 
*Education     24600 23946 21548 21810 15000 25240 
*Other     119300 114894 113566 108743 113000 84244 
 
Source: UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Ankara Office (2002-2006); Aliens,  
Borders and Asylum Bureau (2000-2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Asylum Applications to Turkey (1997-2005) 
 Iranians Iraqis Others Total 
Case Persons Case Persons Case Persons Case Persons 
1997 746 1392 1275 2939 83 117 2104 4448 
1998 1169 1979 2350 4672 124 187 3643 6838 
1999 2069 3843 1148 2472 184 290 3401 6605 
2000 2125 3926 791 1671 108 180 3024 5777 
2001 1841 3485 497 998 372 709 2710 5177 
2002 1456 2505 402 974 219 315 2077 3794 
2003 1715 3092 159 342 373 514 2247 3948 
2004 1225 2030 472 956 540 922 2237 3908 
2005 1021 1716 490 1047 753 1151 2264 3914 
Total 13367 23968 7584 16071 2756 4375 23707 44399 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data provided by the UNHCR (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees) Ankara Office (2002-2005) and Aliens, Borders and Asylum Bureau (2000-
2005). 
 
 
 Table 5: Remittance Inflows, Exports, and Imports in Turkish Economy, 1964-2004 
Year 
Remittance 
(x Million 
USD) 
Exports 
(x Million 
USD) 
Imports 
(x Million 
USD) 
Remittance as  
% of Trade Deficit 
Remittance as  
% of GNP 
1964 8 411 537 6.3 0.1 
1965 69.8 464 572 64.6 0.6 
1966 115.3 490 718 50.6 0.8 
1967 93 523 685 57.4 0.6 
1968 107.3 496 764 40.0 0.6 
1969 140.6 537 801 53.3 0.7 
1970 273 588 948 75.8 1.5 
1971 471.4 677 1171 95.4 2.7 
1972 740 885 1563 109.1 3.3 
1973 1183 1317 2086 153.8 4.1 
1974 1425 1532 3777 63.5 3.6 
1975 1313 1401 4738 39.3 2.7 
1976 982 1960 5129 31.0 1.8 
1977 930 1753 5797 23.0 1.5 
1978 983 2288 4599 42.5 1.4 
1979 1694 2261 5069 60.3 2.2 
1980 2071 2910 7909 41.4 3.0 
1981 2490 4703 8933 58.9 3.4 
1982 2140 5746 8843 69.1 3.2 
1983 1513 5728 9235 43.1 2.4 
1984 1807 7134 10757 49.9 3.0 
1985 1714 8255 11344 55.5 2.5 
1986 1634 7457 11105 44.8 2.1 
1987 1021 10190 14158 25.7 1.2 
1988 1776 11662 14335 66.4 2.0 
1989 3040 12960 15792 107.3 2.8 
1990 3243 13626 22302 37.4 2.2 
1991 2819 13672 21038 38.3 1.9 
1992 3008 14891 22872 37.7 1.9 
1993 2919 15610 29428 21.1 1.6 
1994 2627 18390 23270 53.8 2.0 
1995 3327 21975 35709 24.2 2.0 
1996 3542 32446 43627 31.7 1.9 
1997 4197 32647 48599 26.3 2.2 
1998 5356 31220 45922 36.4 2.6 
1999 4529 29325 40671 39.9 2.5 
2000 4560 31375 54503 19.7 2.3 
2001 2786 35000 41399 43.5 1.9 
2002 1936 35753 51554 12.3 1.1 
2003 1710 47068 69340 7.7 0.7 
2004 804 63121 97540 2.3 0.2 
2005 851 73476 116773 1.9 0.2 
2006 1111 85534 139575 2.1 0.3 
2007 1209 107215 170373 2.0 0.2 
Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006), based on various official sources in Turkey. 
  
Table 6: Export, Workers’ Remittances and Luggage Trade Revenues (million 
USD), 1996–2007 
Years Export Luggage trade Workers’ remittances 
1996 32067 8842 3542 
1997 32110 5849 4197 
1998 31662 3689 5356 
1999 28842 2255 4529 
2000 30721 2946 4560 
2001 34347 3039 2786 
2002 40071 4065 1936 
2003 51130 3953 1710 
2004 66956 3880 804 
2005 76817 3473 851 
2006 85535 6408 1111 
2007 107215 6002 1209 
 
       Source: Treasury (2004), Central Bank of Turkey (2007).
 Table 7: Turks Changing Citizenship in Europe by Country, 1991-2002 
Country 1991-1993 1994-1996 1997-1999 2000-2002 1991-2002 
 # (x1000) % # (x1000) % # (x1000) % # (x1000) % # (x1000) % 
Germany 20.3 27.8 97.0 42.7 129.1 56.8 159.4 63.4 405.8 52.1 
Austria 4.7 6.4 6.6 2.9 7.8 3.4 18.3 7.2 37.4 4.8 
Belgium 7.2 9.9 13.0 5.7 17.5 7.7 31.7 12.6 69.4 8.9 
Denmark 1.1 1.5 2.6 1.1 5.4 2.4 5.9 2.3 15.0 1.9 
France 2.8 3.8 8.8 3.9 14.5 6.4 13.8 5.5 39.9 5.1 
Netherlands 29.5 40.4 87.6 38.5 39.9 17.6 10.2 4.1 167.2 21.5 
Sweden 5.8 7.9 7.6 3.3 4.9 2.2 4.2 1.7 22.5 2.9 
Switzerland 1.4 1.9 3.6 1.6 6.2 2.7 6.2 2.5 17.4 2.2 
UK 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 2.0 0.9 2.5 1.0 5.2 0.7 
Total 73.0 100.0 227.3 100.0 227.3 100.0 251.2 100.0 778.8 100.0 
 
Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Foreigners Who Have Acquired Turkish Citizenship, 1995–2006 
Country Number Reason 
Bulgaria  19998 Other 
Bulgaria  3636 Marriage 
Iraq  1384 Other 
Iraq  251 Marriage 
Iran  1080 Other 
Iran  257 Marriage 
Azerbaijan  3876 Marriage 
Romania  2894 Marriage 
Russia  2193 Marriage 
Moldova  1292 Marriage 
Subtotal 36861 65.30% 
Total Marriage 24300 43.00% 
Total Others 32149 57.00% 
Total 56449 100.00% 
 
Source: Bureau of Population and Citizenship, Ministry of Interior (2001). 
 
